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BANKRUPTCY

Willis v. Celotex Corp.
978 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed (Feb. 11, 1993)
When a debtor files a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, all of the debtor's property becomes part of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. 25 The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the bankruptcy estate. 26 Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code automatically
27
stays any proceedings against the debtor or against bankruptcy property.
In addition, section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy
or
courts to issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
28
appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
In Willis v. Celotex Corp.29 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia had the authority to order a third party
surety to pay the proceeds of a supersedeas bond to a judgment creditor.
In order to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over the
bond, the Fourth Circuit considered the following three bankruptcy issues:
1) does a third party surety of a supersedeas bond have such an identity
of interest with the judgment debtor that 11 U.S.C. section 362 stays
proceedings against the surety, even when the surety owes an independent
contractual duty to the creditor; 2) is a supersedeas bond posted by a
judgment debtor who later files for bankruptcy an asset of the judgment
debtor's bankruptcy estate; and 3) may a bankruptcy court stay execution
against a third party surety of a supersedeas bond pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A.
section 105(a) after the judgment debtor has filed for bankruptcy?
In Willis, a group of plaintiffs sued Celotex Corporation (Celotex) for
asbestos related injuries. The Willis plaintiffs won their suit and the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia awarded the
Willis plaintiffs $526,500 in damages. Celotex appealed. In order to stay
execution of the judgments pending appeal, Celotex posted a supersedeas
bond.
Celotex entered into a series of financial transactions in order to
obtain surety for the bond. First, Celotex used corporate funds to purchase
some certificates of deposit. Celotex pledged these certificates of deposit
to First Florida Bank and the bank issued irrevocable letters of credit in
amounts equal to or less than the certificates of deposit. The irrevocable
letters of credit benefitted Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna).

25.
§ 1334(d)
26.
27.
28.
29.

MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1987)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West Supp. 1992).
978 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
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In return for the letters of credit, Aetna agreed to serve as surety for the
supersedeas bond Celotex posted in the Willis case.
Celotex lost the Willis appeal. Before the Willis plaintiffs collected
their judgment against Celotex, Celotex filed a bankruptcy petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. The
bankruptcy court entered an order pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. section 105(a)
precluding judgment creditors from proceeding against supersedeas bonds
posted by Celotex.
A few days later in the district court, the Willis plaintiffs sought
payment of the bond from Aetna. The district court decided that the
bankruptcy court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the bond because
the bond was not part of the Celotex bankruptcy estate. The district court
ordered Aetna to pay the proceeds of the bond to the Willis plaintiffs.
Celotex appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit.
On appeal, Celotex argued that the bond was part of Celotex's bankruptcy
estate and that the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. section 362
therefore precluded the Willis plaintiffs from moving for release of the
bond proceeds in the district court. Celotex also contended that section
362 stayed any claim against Aetna because Aetna and Celotex had an
identity of interest with respect to the bond such that any proceeding
against Aetna was tantamount to a proceeding against Celotex. Finally,
Celotex argued that the bankruptcy court's order precluding judgment
creditors from proceeding against supersedeas bonds posted by Celotex
properly stayed execution against Aetna.
The Fourth Circuit initially decided the case on June 18, 1992, in an
opinion which was published at 970 F.2d 1292. On August 7, 1992, the
Fourth Circuit granted the Willis plaintiffs' petition for rehearing and
withdrew the June 18th opinion. The Fourth Circuit decided the case again
on October 22, 1992.
In the October opinion, the Fourth- Circuit first examined whether 11
U.S.C. section 362 stayed the proceeding against Aetna. The Fourth Circuit
noted that the terms of Celotex's supersedeas bond imposed a separate,
independent duty on Aetna to pay the judgments. Because Aetna owed
an independent contractual duty to the Willis plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit
decided that Aetna and Celotex did not have such an identity of interest
that section 362 stayed proceedings against Aetna.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit determined that the supersedeas bond
was not part of Celotex's bankruptcy estate at the time the district court
ordered Aetna to pay the bond. The Fourth Circuit stated that Celotex's
interest in the bond expired several weeks before the district court ordered
Aetna to pay, when the Fourth Circuit upheld the damages award to the
Willis plaintiffs. Therefore, the Willis plaintiffs' proceeding against Aetna
was not stayed- by section 362 as a proceeding against the property of the
bankruptcy estate. The Fourth Circuit expressly left open the issue of
whether a supersedeas bond is part of the judgment debtor's bankruptcy
estate while the appeal is pending.
The Fourth Circuit then considered whether the bankruptcy court's
order pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. 105(a) properly stayed execution against
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Aetna on the bond. The Fourth Circuit cited A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin0
for the proposition that bankruptcy courts may enjoin actions against
third parties under section 105(a) if failure to enjoin would adversely
influence and pressure the debtor through the third party or if failure to
enjoin would damage the debtor's ability to formulate a Chapter 11 plan.3 '
The Fourth Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court faced a monumental
task in overseeing the Celotex bankruptcy proceedings because Celotex
was involved in tort suits nationwide and had already posted nearly seventy
million dollars in supersedeas bonds. The Fourth Circuit also noted that
the bankruptcy court had stated that a race to the courthouse by Celotex's
judgment creditors would burden the reorganization process. Based on the
unusual complexity of the Celotex bankruptcy proceedings, the Fourth
Circuit decided that the bankruptcy court's section 105(a) order was proper
under Piccinin. The Fourth Circuit therefore vacated the order of the
district court and remanded the case for further proceedings at such time
as the bankruptcy court should lift the section 105(a) stay.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Willis makes it clear that bankruptcy
courts may'stay actions against third parties under 11 U.S.C.A. section
105(a) when such actions would further complicate massive and complex
reorganization proceedings. The Willis decision only partially resolved a
second issue: whether a supersedeas bond posted by a judgment debtor
who later files for bankruptcy becomes part of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. The circuits currently are split on this issue. 32 While the Fourth
Circuit in Willis decided that the debtor's interest in a supersedeas bond
is terminated if the debtor loses his appeal, the court has not yet addressed
whether the bond is part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate during the
pendency of the appeal.
In Re Geris
973 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1992)
In Gatewood v. Gatewood,33 the Supreme Court of Virginia stated
that if a party has a right to redeem a mortgage on real property and

30. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).
31. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1003 (4th Cir.) (explaining that
bankruptcy court may stay proceedings against third parties in order to prevent detrimental effect
on debtor or reorganization process), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).
32. Compare Grubb v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 833 F.2d 222, 224-26 (10th Cir. 1987)
(citing Mid-Jersey and refusing to exonerate bonds posted by bank prior to its insolvency) and
Mid-Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640, 643 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating
that supersedeas bond posted by debtor pending appeal did not become part of his bankruptcy
estate) with Sheldon v. Munford, 902 F.2d 7, 8 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that § 362 does stay
proceedings against supersedeas bond because debtor has stake in bond and noting split in
circuits) and Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing
criticism of Mid-Jersey but resting decision on other grounds).
33. 75 Va. 407 (1881).
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does in fact redeem, the redeeming party is entitled to subrogation of the
mortgage.3 4 Gatewood increased the list of parties having a cognizable
property interest in the estate by adding parties who have an inchoate
dower interest in property subject to a mortgage.3 5 Subsequently, in In re
Bialac,3 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that a debtor in bankruptcy had a preforeclosure right to redeem collateral
because of the debtor's one-sixth ownership interest in the property and
refused to lift the automatic stay provision of the federal Bankruptcy
37
Code.
In light of these holdings, the Fourth Circuit in In re Geris38 considered
whether a bankrupt guarantor, who is not an owner, has an equitable
interest in property such that the automatic stay provision of the federal
Bankriptcy Code39 would preclude foreclosure on the property by a
creditor. In Geris, the adversary complainants in bankruptcy-Saratoga
Group, Ltd. (Saratoga) and shareholders R. Donald Honeycutt and Sidney
Worley, Jr.-protested the foreclosure and sale of property owned by
them and guaranteed by the bankrupt party. The complainants alleged
that the creditor's foreclosure on the real property violated the federal
automatic stay provision and was therefore void.
In May 1987, Saratoga purchased real property in Manassas, Virginia,
from Samuel J. Geris, Sr., for $717,102.75. Geris was one of three
principal shareholders of Saratoga. Saratoga financed this purchase by
taking a $400,000 loan from Peoples National Bank (PNB), secured by a
first deed of trust and guaranteed by Geris. For the remaining amount,
Saratoga executed a note to Geris for $317,102.75, which was due in April
1988 and secured by a second deed of trust. Subsequently, Geris pledged
the note to Blakely Bank and Trust (BB&T). BB&T demanded payment
from Saratoga in the spring of 1988. In order to secure BB&T's release,
Saratoga and Geris arranged a second loan for $300,000 from PNB,
secured by another Deed of Trust and guaranteed by Geris.
In June 1988, Geris sold his interest in Saratoga to the other principal
shareholders, Honeycutt and Worley. In exchange, Honeycutt and Worley
agreed to indemnify Geris as to all corporate liability incurred as either a
guarantor or principal. In May 1990, Geris filed a Chapter 11 petition in
bankruptcy. At approximately the same time Saratoga defaulted on the
$400,000 loan from PNB. In July 1990, PNB foreclosed on the property
and sold it at public auction.
The bankruptcy court exercising jurisdiction over the Geris Chipter
11 proceeding held that the automatic stay provision did not apply to the
Manassas property because the bankrupt party, Geris, did not own the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Gatewood v. Gatewood, 75 Va. 407, 411 (1881).
Id. at 412-13.
712 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1983).
In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426, 431-33 (9th Cir. 1983).
973 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1992).
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1988).
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property and only the bankrupt party is entitled to the protection afforded
by the automatic stay provision. Thus, the bankruptcy court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying relief.
On appeal, Saratoga argued that Geris had an equitable interest as a
guarantor for the debt that the Manassas property secured. Saratoga
reasoned that because Geris would have been liable for any deficiency on
the sale of the Manassas property, Geris should have had the right to
redeem the debt in order to maximize the sale of the property. Saratoga
relied on In re Bialac for the proposition that the right to redeem was a
property interest of the Geris estate and was therefore afforded the
protection of the automatic stay provision of the federal Bankruptcy Code.
The Fourth Circuit first noted that Geris did have a material interest
in the sale of the Manassas property. The Fourth Circuit reasoned,
however, that it could not accept Geris's interest as sufficient to trigger
the automatic stay because the foreclosure rights of secured creditors in
any property that is also secured by a bankrupt guarantor would be cut
off. The Fourth Circuit refused to allow such a result and affirmed the
bankruptcy court's denial of relief.
Whether courts shall afford a debtor in bankruptcy the protection of
the automatic stay provision due to a foreclosure sale of property for
which the debtor in bankruptcy has previously guaranteed was an issue of
first impression in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit's holding protects
secured creditors' foreclosure rights on real property collateral. Although
the Fourth Circuit stated that the bankrupt debtor did have a valid material
interest in the sale, the court also noted that in this instance the bankrupt
debtor was already indemnified by the owners of the property. The Fourth
Circuit did not indicate whether a guarantor's interest in maximizing the
sale of property under foreclosure could ever trigger the federal automatic
stay provision. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's refusal to extend protection of
the automatic stay may be limited to situations in which the guarantor
has a right to indemnity from the owners.
In Re Coker
973 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1992)
An ongoing debate in bankruptcy law concerns the interpretation of
11 U.S.C. section 506(a). 40 Section 506(a) sets forth the standard for the
valuation of a creditor's allowable secured claim stating as follows:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the

40. See In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248-50 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing conflicting interpretations of § 506(a) in bankruptcy courts).
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extent of the value of such creditor's interest in such property...
and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the estates interest in
the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount
of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or

use of such property ....

41

Courts have interpreted this section inconsistently when deciding whether
the costs (for example, broker's fees, title insurance, and financing costs)
of selling the secured property should serve to lessen the value of the
debtor's interest and thus lessening the value of the creditor's secured
claim. 42 Chapter 13 bankruptcy, however, does not require the sale of
residual property. 43 Some courts have held that even when debtors do not
intend to sell the property, they can nonetheless deduct the costs of a
"hypothetical" sale from the value of their interest. 44 Other courts, by
4
contrast, do not allow deductions for hypothetical costs.
The inconsistent interpretations of section 506(a) result from the
tension between the first and second sentences of the section. 46 The first
sentence stresses the value of the creditor's interest, and implies that
because the creditor can only realize this value through a sale of the
secured property, the true value to the creditor must reflect a deduction
for the costs of a sale. 47 The second sentence, however, places an emphasis
on the "purpose of the valuation" and the "proposed disposition or use
of the property." This emphasis suggests that if the debtor does not intend
to sell the property, a court should not allow a deduction for costs of a
hypothetical sale in a valuation under section 506(a). 41 Against this back49
ground, the Fourth Circuit interpreted section 506(a) in In re Coker.
In In re Coker, plaintiffs David and Elizabeth Coker owned real estate
in Virginia Beach, Virginia. The real estate was encumbered by two deeds

41. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
42. See Balbus, 933 F.2d at 248 (noting that § 506(a) interpretational conflict concerns
whether courts can allow deductions of hypothetical sales costs from value of creditor's secured

claim).
43. See In re Coker, 973 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that Chapter 13 allows
debtors to retain their homes by reaffirming mortgage debt).
44. See In re Smith, 92 B.R. 287, 289-90 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that deduction
for costs of sale is allowed even when debtor does not intend to sell property); In re Claeys, 81
B.R. 985, 990-92 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (same).
45. See In re Usry, 106 B.R. 759, 760-62 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that hypothetical
sales costs are not deductible); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 105 B.R. 798, 802-04 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1989) (same).
46. See In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (identifying conflict between first
and second sentences of § 506(a) as source of interpretational inconsistencies); Liberty Assocs.,
105 B.R. at 803 (same).
47. See Liberty Assocs., 105 B.R. at 803 (discussing argument for valuation based on first
sentence of § 506(a)).
48. See id. (discussing argument for valuation based on second sentence of § 506(a)).
49. 973 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1992) (addressing interpretational conflict of § 506(a)).
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of trust securing notes totalling $91,504.87. The defendant, Sovran Equity
Mortgage Corp. (Sovran), held a note secured by the junior deed of trust
worth $9,504.87. In 1991, the plaintiffs petitioned for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and moved to avoid Sovran's junior deed of trust. The plaintiffs
introduced testimony showing that the appraised value of the property
less estimated selling costs (real estate commissions, discount points, and
closing costs) was less than the total secured debt of $91,504.87, thus,
pursuant to section 506(a), Sovran's claim was not fully secured.
In addition to rejecting the plaintiffs' low market value estimate of
$91,500 (opting instead for Sovran's estimate of $95,000), the bankruptcy
court held that a deduction for selling costs was not allowed where, as in
the plaintiffs' case, the bankrupt party's plan of rehabilitation does not
include the selling of the property. The bankruptcy court, therefore, denied
the plaintiffs' motion, finding the claims of Sovran fully secured. The
district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court and the
plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the decisions of the lower courts. In so
holding, the Coker court recognized the inconsistencies of the interpretations of section 506(a), noting that a court's decision on the propriety of
deducting hypothetical selling costs turned on which of the two sentences
in section 506(a) the court emphasized. Courts relying on the first sentence,
stressing the value of the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the
property, conclude that it is proper to deduct hypothetical selling costs.
Courts relying on the second sentence, emphasizing the purpose of the
valuation and the proposed disposition of the property, do not allow the
hypothetical sales cost deduction. In expressing its approval of reliance
on the second sentence of section 506(a), the Coker court noted that this
interpretation adheres to the guideline of statutory interpretation suggesting
that all provisions of a statute should have effect. To allow hypothetical
deductions, the court reasoned, ignores the "purpose of the valuation,"
and the "proposed disposition of the property," thus leaving no field of
operation for the second sentence of section 506(a).
The Coker court found that the case of In re Balbus, wherein the
Fourth Circuit addressed the interpretation of section 506(a) from a
different perspective, controlled its decision. In Balbus, the creditor, rather
than the debtor, argued for the deduction of hypothetical sales costs in
order to raise the amount of unsecured debt above the $100,000 jurisdictional limit for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court in Balbus
disallowed the deduction and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. In so holding,
the court in Balbus analyzed the second sentence of section 506(a) using
a two-pronged approach. The first prong focuses on the purpose of the
valuation. The court concluded that because the purpose of the valuation
was to determine jurisdiction, the no-deduction approach provided the
more definite basis. The second prong focuses on the proposed use or
disposition of the property. Because the debtor in Balbus did not intend
to sell the property, the court concluded that this prong also prescribed
the no-deduction approach.
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Applying the Balbus analysis to the case at hand, the Coker court
found that under prong one, the "purpose of the valuation," the purpose
was to determine the secured portion of Sovran's claim. The court found
this "purpose" consistent with the mandate of the first sentence of section
506(a) requiring a determination of the true value of the creditor's interest.
The second prong, "the proposed use or disposition" of the property,
therefore, presented the controlling question. The Coker court concluded
that because the debtors did not intend to sell the property, it must deny
the deduction of hypothetical sales costs.
In support of its conclusion, the Coker court noted that an advantage
of Chapter 13 bankruptcy is that debtors can retain their homes by
reaffirming the mortgage debt. The court reasoned that it is anomalous
to allow debtors to reduce their mortgage debt based on the costs of a
hypothetical sale of their property when Congress designed Chapter 13
specifically to allow debtors to avoid a sale. Allowing hypothetical deductions, the court reasoned, would allow debtors to 'eat with the hounds
' 50
and run with the hares.'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Coker is significant in that it solidifies
the position set forth in Balbus.5 ' Prior to Coker, the applicability of the
Balbus interpretation of section 506(a) to cases where the debtor, rather
than the creditor, sought to deduct hypothetical sales costs was not entirely
clear.5 2 Having applied the Balbus analysis to Coker, the Fourth Circuit
has firmly established its position in the interpretational debate of section
506(a).
In Re Bryson Properties, XVIII
961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992)
The absolute priority rule in bankruptcy reorganization provides that
a reorganization plan must dispense all senior claims before a junior claim
receives or retains property. A traditional exception to this common law
rule is the new capital exception rule. The new capital exception rule
entitles shareholders to make a contribution of capital to the debtor in
return for an equivalent amount of equity. 3 In 1978 Congress codified
the common-law absolute priority rule into the Bankruptcy Code,54 but
made no mention of the new capital exception. Whether the codified
absolute priority rule includes the new capital exception has been the
subject of controversy. The United States Supreme Court questioned the

50. In re Coker, 973 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1992).
51. See id. at 260 (holding that Balbus controlled court's decision).

52. See id. (noting that holding in Balbus addressed § 506(a) issue from different perspective).

53. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939) (ruling that
stockholders of debtor may contribute new capital and retain their equity interest as exception
to absolute priority rule).

54. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(H) (1988).
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continued viability of the new capital exception but failed to decide whether
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code abolished the exception. 5 The bankruptcy
courts are divided on this issue,5 6 and at least two federal circuit courts
7
have explicitly chosen not to address the issue.
5
In In re Bryson Properties,XVIII, 8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the codified absolute priority
rule includes the new capital exception. In this case, Bryson Properties
XVIII (Bryson) purchased a commercial complex that was subject to a
mortgage held by Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). Bryson subsequently defaulted on the mortgage and filed for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the time of Bryson's Chapter 11
filing, Travelers's claims consisted of a secured claim equal to the value
of Bryson's interest in the commercial complex and an unsecured deficiency
claim. Bryson's reorganization plan divided the claims and interests of its
creditors, including Travelers's, into eight classes. In addition, the plan
provided Bryson's partners with the opportunity to contribute capital in
return for continued control of the partnership. The bankruptcy court
confirmed the plan over the objection of Travelers. Travelers appealed to
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Travelers then appealed
to the Fourth Circuit arguing that the plan was not fair and equitable to
either its secured claim or its unsecured claim, and, therefore, the lower
courts erred in confirming the plan.
On appeal, Travelers first argued that the plan used an incorrect
discount rate which understated the present value of its secured claim.
The court disagreed, finding the discount rate appropriate. Travelers then
argued that the plan wrongly separated the unsecured claims in order to
manipulate the confirmation vote. The Fourth Circuit agreed with Travelers and determined that Bryson violated the fair and equitable requirement through its manipulation of the voting classes. In so deciding, the
55. Northwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 (1988) (questioning continued

viability of new capital exception, however refusing to rule on issue).
56. Compare In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership, 134 B.R. 165, 175 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991)
(holding statute does not bar new capital exception); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971,
984-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding exception exists when there is present contribution with
showing of necessity for contribution); In re Snyder, 99 B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. I11.
1989)
(holding that new capital exception exists until higher court eliminates) with In re Outlook/
Century Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that plain language of statute
makes exception no longer viable); Piedmont Assocs. v. Cigna Property & Casualty Ins. Co.,
132 B.R. 75, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that statutory language and congressional intent
preclude exception); In re Lumber Exch. Ltd. Partnership, 125 B.R. 1000, 1008 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1991) (holding that confirmation unfair when debtor's shareholders given right to retain
or acquire interest through cash contribution), aff'd on other grounds, 134 B.R. 354 (D. Minn.
1991).
57. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134,. 139 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
rule on issue); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 136163 (7th Cir. 1990) (questioning viability of exception but ruling it inapplicable to facts sub judice).
58. 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
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court did not need to address any further issues. However, citing the need
for judicial economy, the Fourth Circuit addressed the final issue of
whether the codified absolute priority rule included the common-law new
capital exception.
Travelers argued that the reorganization plan violated the absolute
priority rule. The plan satisfied the partners' junior claim prior to settlement of Travelers's senior claim. The Fourth Circuit examined the legislative history of the absolute priority rule and found it inconclusive. The
court then scrutinized the plain words of the Bankruptcy statute. The
Fourth Circuit determined that the partners' retention of interest violated
the absolute priority rule as specified in the statute because the equity
holders had the exclusive right to retain their interest prior to satisfaction
of Travelers's claim. Bryson argued that even though it retained an interest
prior to the satisfaction of Travelers's claim, no violation existed because
the codified absolute priority rule included the previously recognized new
capital exception. The court explained that the bankruptcy court wrongly
confirmed unless the absolute priority rule includes the new capital exception.
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the new capital exception in light of the
principles of fairness and equity which guide the confirmation process. A
court may confirm a reorganization plan over the objection of one claimant
if the plan is fair and equitable to the dissenter. 9 The absolute priority
rule was developed to assure fairness to the objecting party. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned, therefor.e, that if the rule includes the new capital
exception, the exception must also assure fairness. The court found that
Bryson's plan did not meet the fairness requirement and determined that
the new capital exception did not apply. According to the Fourth Circuit,
by giving itself the exclusive right to contribute capital and thereby the
right to first recovery, Bryson unfairly deprived Travelers of an equal
opportunity to satisfy its claim. According to the Fourth Circuit, fairness
and equity dictated that even if the new capital exception existed, it would
not be applicable under these circumstances. The court implied that only
under narrow circumstances would the new capital exception be viable.
The United States Courts of Appeal have hesitated to overrule the
new capital exception. The Fifth Circuit refused to rule on the issue
deciding a similar case on other grounds. 60 The Seventh Circuit questioned
the viability of the new capital exception, but failed to overrule the
exception. 6' In Bryson, the Fourth Circuit failed to definitively conclude
whether the exception remains viable. In dictum, the court reasoned that
if the exception were viable, then principles of fairness and equity would

59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
60. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
rule on new capital exception issue).
61. See Khan & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1341, 136163 (7th Cir. 1990) (questioning viability of exception but ruling it inapplicable to facts).

